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IFR-THE LIABILITY OF THE CHARTMAKER
PHILIP R. MCCOWAN*
A CALIFORNIA trial lawyer's perspective on the subject of
civil liability is necessarily influenced by the "progressive"
attitudes of the California courts and by the liberal awards ren-
dered by our juries in personal injury cases. Whether this admitted
influence is a positive or a negative one is not particularly relevant,
but it has prompted an emphasis in this paper on California law.
No effort has been made to examine in depth the potential liability
of publishers of instrument approach charts on a state-by-state
basis.'
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In order to understand the chart maker's potential liaiblity, one
must have a basic knowledge of what an instrument approach
procedure is, what it is not, and how it evolves into a chart which
is then utilized by general aviation and professional pilots. In 1926
the United States Congress passed the Air Commerce Acte which
gave to the Secretary of Commerce responsibility for preparing
aeronautical charts for commercial and private pilots.' The respon-
sibility for compilation was delegated to the Coast and Geodetic
Survey (now the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
* B.A., San Jose St. Univ., 1964; J.D., Univ. of Calif., 1967; Lecturer in
Aviation Law, San Jose St. Univ., Attorney at Law, Partner in the firm Popelka,
Allard, McCowan and Jones, San Jose, Calif. The author wishes to acknowledge
the assistance of Bruce C. Janke, B.S., Mich. St. Univ., 1971; J.D., Univ. of Santa
Clara, School of Law, 1976; Attorney at Law, San Jose, Calif.
'Essentially all instrument approach procedures for the United States and
United States possessions are published by either the Jeppesen-Sanderson Co. of
Colorado or the National Ocean Survey (NOS), a branch of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce.
"Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. Pt. 2 568.
aId. 5 5(b).
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tion) .' By the end of 1927, six "strip maps" covering various U. S.
air routes had been published. The need for detailed approach
information first was met by a series of sketches and diagrams in
the Department's "Airway Bulletin," published in 1928.' In 1930
airport sketches were published on the back of the first edition
of the Sectional Chart Series.
In 1930, Mr. E. B. Jeppesen began flying as an airmail pilot for
Boeing Air Transport. Mr. Jeppesen felt that his personal safety
would be improved if he had available to him more detailed in-
formation with respect to the routes that he was flying. He bought
a small notebook in Cheyenne, Wyoming, and began compiling
data on airport runway patterns, field lengths, natural and man-
made obstacles, and beacon lights. He also drew cross-sections of
unusual terrain.'
When the government finally installed low frequency radio
guides in 1931, Mr. Jeppesen drew his first approach profile which
graphically indicated how pilots should descend to the field por-
trayed. Radio frequencies appropriate for the approach were also
noted. Mr. Jeppesen copied by hand a number of notebooks and
made them available for friends. He later had fifty copies printed
which sold for $10.00 each. The present Jeppesen-Sanderson
Company publishes in excess of 6,700 approach procedures from
their Denver facility and thousands more from its facility in
Frankfurt, Germany.!
In 1941, the Coast and Geodetic Survey began work on a series
of Instrument Approach and Landing Charts designed to serve
the pilot's needs when approaching an airport on instruments and
under conditions of low visibility. The charts were also meant to
be a visual aid when the pilot had broken through the clouds and
could confirm his location by terrain identification.'
In 1943, the Coast and Geodetic Survey began publication of
a bound volume of instrument letdown procedures for the Federal
4"Id.
5U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, AIRWAY BULLETIN (1928).
6 EMPIRE, Oct. 30, 1977, at 16.
7 Id.
8 W. RisTow, AVIATION CARTOGRAPHY; A HISTORICO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL STUDY
OF AERONAUTICAL CHARTS (2d ed. 1960); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NOAA
PLAN FOR AERONAUTICAL CHARTING 57 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NOAA
PLAN].
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Government and a loose-leaf binder of instrument letdown charts
with world-wide coverage. The series was expanded as improved
navigational devices were installed. In October 1977, the NOS
published procedures for 4,348 approaches pertaining to 1,913
airports."
Prior to 1968, there were multiple federal publications per-
taining to criteria applicable to instrument approaches. Recogniz-
ing the problems presented by scattered sources for pertinent in-
strument approach criteria, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) began in 1964 to centralize the criteria in what was to be
a single publication. In 1967 the U. S. Standard for Terminal Ap-
proach Procedures (TERPS) became effective." Approach charts
dealing with domestic and U. S. possession approach procedures
are prepared in conformance with a form 8260," which in turn
is prepared in conformance with form 8260.19."
Terminal instrument procedures will be provided at civil air-
ports open to the aviation public whenever a "reasonable need"
is demonstrated." Requests for new civil instrument procedures
will be accepted from any "aviation source" provided the request
indicates that the airport owner-operator has been advised of the
request.' The airport must be found acceptable for instrument
flight rules operations following an airport airspace analysis.
Prior to establishing or revising terminal instrument procedures
for civil airports, the FAA will, as required, coordinate such pro-
cedures with the appropriate civil aviation organization.'
The Flight Standards Service Branch (FSSB) and the Flight
Inspection Field Office (FIFO) of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration develop the data for new or revised procedures and this
I NOAA PLAN, supra note 8, at 61.
10 FAA, U.S. STANDARDS FOR TERMINAL APPROACH PROCEDURES (1976) [here-
inafter cited as TERPS]; see 32 Fed. Reg. 13,909 (1967); 14 C.F.R. § 97.20
(1967).
1 1See Appendix A; 14 C.F.R. § 97.20 (1977). This form is the successor to
what was previously FAA Form 511.
12 The 8260.19 form is followed by flight procedures specialists to assure a
uniform method of presenting data on the 8260 form.
'
3 TERPS, supra note 10, at 5 120b.
14 1d. § 121.
1 Id. § 122a.
16Id. § 150b.
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data is ultimately published in the 8260 format." The basic infor-
mation is sent to the National Flight Data Center (NFDC) after
the FIFO and the FSSB have reviewed the data and after the pro-
posed approach has been flown. The NFDC will then review all
information sent to them and approve or disapprove the proposed
Standard Instrument Procedure. If the procedure is approved the
NFDC compiles the raw data and publishes it in the textual form
of the 8260. The 8260 form and, ultimately, the chart portrayal
of the procedure provide the instrument rated pilot with the in-
formation necessary to execute the procedure. The text of the
newly approved procedure is also published in the Federal Register
and becomes law. The NOS and Jeppesen then receive and pub-
lish the procedures in their chart format. If after publication of a
procedure an unfavorable pattern report is received, the FAA
performs an inflight check of the procedure.
Procedures pertaining to airports outside of the United States
and the United States territories are not based upon TERPS nor
are they made available to the NOS or to Jeppesen in the 8260
format. Most foreign countries, however, are members of the Inter-
national Civil Aeronautical Organization (ICAO)." Members of
the ICAO publish Aeronautical Information Publications (AIP's),'9
which include instrument procedure charts applicable to airports
within their jurisdiction." The NOS and Jeppesen subscribe to the
AIP's and when an AIP chart is received it will be republished in
their format.
At the present time there are in excess of 4,000 domestic instru-
ment approaches. 1 With this figure in mind, one can begin to
appreciate the number of man-made and natural obstructions that
are to be found in the immediate vicinity of these approaches. The
17 The following discussion of procedures leading to publication of instrument
approach charts is based on information provided to the author by the Jeppesen-
Sanderson Co.
"The ICAO is presently headquartered in Montreal, Canada, and virtually
every country is a member of this organization. The Peoples Republic of China,
Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos are among the non-member countries.
"The AIP's provide detailed approach procedure information, including ap-
proach charts.
20 See Appendix B for a reproduction of one AlP.
21 Information provided to the author by the Jeppesen-Sanderson Co. If the
Americas and the Pacific are included there are approximately 7000 procedures
presently published.
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chart publisher necessarily relies upon the accuracy and com-
pleteness of the information provided to them in the 8260 form
or the equivalent AIP presentation.'
As will be discussed more fully below, approach charts have
been criticized for lack of clarity. The chart publisher utilizes
"commonly understood" symbology to relate information in an
abbreviated, schematic form. The symbols and their meanings are
described in the legends that are made available to the chart sub-
scriber along with the charts. While symbols and legends are
intended to assist pilots in identifying and understanding pertinent
information on a given approach, the legends have been criticized
as inadequate in their translation of the symbology.
In order to evaluate the liability of the chart publisher, it is
important to have some conceptual notion of what limitations,
practical or otherwise, are to be placed upon the publisher's "duty"
to educate the already instrument rated pilot. It should not be un-
reasonable for the chart publisher to assume that the pilots utilizing
the procedures have previously received training in approach chart
interpretation. To appreciate the potential liability of the chart
publisher, it must be recognized that thousands of instrument ap-
proaches are being made daily throughout the world. Approaches
are being made by relatively low time general aviation pilots in
aircraft having only the most basic instrument equipment as well
as by 747 captains using the most sophisticated equipment avail-
able.
Approaches are generally classified into precision" and non-
precision approaches?' Each approach requires different data.'
As can be seen in the appended 8260 form,' the information per-
taining to a prescribed procedure is quite detailed. While the pub-
As a practical matter it is impossible for a chart publisher to make an in-
dependent determination as to the accuracy of the data provided in the source
material.
"These would include a complete Instrument Landing System (ILS) ap-
proach, see TERPS, supra note 10, §§ 900 et seq., or an approach utilizing pre-
cision radar. See id., § 1000 et seq.
24A non-precision approach might utilize a localizer and ILS without glide
slope, the localizer back course, the VOR, the VOR/DME, the non-directional
beacon (NDB), or the ASR approaches. See generally TERPS, supra note 10.
2 While the approaches differ in execution, the format for the chart includes
a Plan and Profile view in every case. See Appendix C.2
'Appendix A.
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lished chart will include the information specified in the 8260
form, the publisher has some discretion in how the required infor-
mation is to be presented.
The chart publisher faces a practical problem in deciding
whether discretionary information should be volunteered. Too
much information on a 4 x 7 inch approach chart can prove more
cluttering than clarifying. How proficient or deficient should the
chart publisher assume the instrument rated pilot to be? Assuming
the specified minimum altitudes provide adequate terrain and ob-
stacle clearance," should the publisher be required to identify ob-
structions along the approach course?
Aircraft litigation is' frequently spawned by accidents that oc-
curred because the pilot's performance, for reasons known or un-
known, fall below his "normal" level of proficiency. Intoxication,
fatigue, illness, preoccupation, and inattentiveness are a few of the
disabilities that frequently lead to accidents and near accidents. In
addition to accurately depicting data specified and required by
the 8260 form or the equivalent AIP, what, if anything, must a
chart producer do to protect the pilot against a lapse in his own
proficiency?
The chart publisher should be permitted the reasonable expecta-
tion that a pilot using an instrument approach chart will have suc-
cessfully completed a well thought out and comprehensive course
on instrument flying. One would hope that such a course would
include an in-depth study of typical approach charts; 8 how they
are to be read, and what information is contained therein.
II. NEGLIGENCE AND THE CHART PUBLISHER
Negligence is often an available theory of recovery that can be
pursued in air crash litigation when a chart is alleged to be de-
ficient. Whether a negligence theory is pursued through trial is
often dependent upon whether a strict products liability theory
is available to the plaintiff. 9
When an injury or a wrongful death suit is filed following an
21 Adequate clearance is defined as a clearance consistent with the TERPS
specification. See, e.g., TERPS, supra note 10, § 221 and Appendix 1, at 2.
8 This should include, at least, charts depicting the ILS, ADF, VOR, and
VOR/DME procedures. See notes 23-24, supra.
29 See Part III, infra.
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aircraft accident there are frequently multiple defendants. The
chart publisher's potential exposure is often closely associated with
the potential exposure of instrument manufacturers, air traffic
controllers, and flight personnel. Whether one or all of the potential
defendants are sued will depend upon the nature of the accident,
the solvency or insurance status of the potential defendants, and
upon tactical considerations too numerous to mention here.
Workmen's compensation statutes in many jurisdictions prohibit
the pursuit of negligent employers and co-employees who would
otherwise be named as defendants. If a suit is filed by a passenger
or a survivor of a passenger all potential defendants are generally
named and served. If a suit is filed by a crew member or by
the crew's employer (generally for a hull loss), the crew's fault,
if any, will be raised only by way of defense.
There ordinarily will be no particular difficulty in applying the
traditional negligence standard of reasonable care to the design
and portrayal on the approach chart of an instrument procedure,
as to the topography identified, obstructions noted, etc. This is not
to say that when the standard is applied the outcome will be pre-
dictable. Presumptively, if a pilot collides with an obstacle during
an instrument approach while on course and while he is above the
prescribed minimum altitude, the specified procedure is an un-
reasonable one. Whether the chart publisher should be found negli-
gent for the publication of the procedure would depend, in part, on
whether the 8260 form prescribed the minimum altitude at the
point of impact and, if it did, whether the chart publisher could rea-
sonably have been expected to discover the potential danger. If the
minimum was incorrectly charted, there would be little question of
the publisher's negligence. If the chart was a republication of an
AIP portrayal, the chart publisher would have had little opportun-
ity to independently determine whether the minimums specified
were adequate.'
If the chart publisher were to deviate from the minimums speci-
fied in the 8260 form or AIP by increasing minimums, and should
an accident occur, one can readily anticipate the argument of
plaintiff's counsel: if the aircraft had been at the lower altitude
specified by the 8260, the mid-air collision would not have oc-
"
0 The impracticality of requiring the chart publisher to survey approaches
firsthand, see note 22, supra, is compounded where foreign countries are involved.
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curred; the icing would have been less difficult to deal with; the
storm would have been less intense; the effect of depressurization
less dramatic; etc.
Where contributory negligence operates as a complete bar to a
negligence action, and where the plaintiff's recovery can be de-
feated by a showing of crew negligence, the negligence cause of
action is either not pleaded or, if pleaded, it will frequently be dis-
missed either before trial or before the case is argued. Similar,
though less compelling, tactical considerations exist where com-
parative negligence principles apply.
In all too many crew cases the claim is one for wrongful death,
and a clear and accurate picture of the crew's use and interpreta-
tion of an approach chart is difficult, if not impossible, to recon-
struct. This reconstruction may be possible if there is a clear and
complete reproduction of a cockpit voice recorder.' While plain-
tiffs' counsel can argue in a negligence case that an obstacle was
negligently omitted from the chart, or that the information pro-
vided was presented in a manner likely to confuse the crew, de-
fense counsel can respond that the crew's inattentiveness or con-
fusion contributed to the cause of the accident. In most jurisdic-
tions, plaintiffs' counsel will be able to avoid a comparison of the
pilot's fault with that of the chart publisher if he is permitted to
pursue a strict liability theory.'
III. STRICT LIABILITY AND THE CHART PUBLISHER
The manufacturer or seller of a defective product may be held
strictly liable for injury caused by his product." The primary policy
"See 14 C.F.R. §5 91.35, 25.1457 (1977).
"A recent Ninth Circuit decision, Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr.
& Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977), holds that a plaintiff's contributory
fault will reduce a strict liability recovery by that percentage of the total fault
attributable to the plaintiff's conduct. See notes 72-77 and accompanying text,
infra.
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct; and
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consideration behind product liability is one designed to protect
the consumer who is injured by a "defect" in a mass-produced
product.'
Before a suit can be decided on a product liability instruction, it
must be established that the chart publisher designed and sold a
"product." Approach charts are published for all domestic air-
lines and most international airlines as well as for general aviation
instrument rated pilots, and the consuming public at large. Argu-
ably, therefore, a loss caused by a defective chart could be spread
among the many subscribers.'
Some jurisdictions have held that the strict liability doctrine and
Uniform Commercial Code warranty provisions do not apply to
the rendition of certain personal services.' These courts have found
that a "service" has been provided rather than the sale of a "good"
or "product" where: (1) There is a pure personal service trans-
action and no tangible chattel is involved in the transaction, as
in the case of a soils engineer who gives his opinion on whether
or not a particular building site is suitable;" or, (2) A defendant
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold . . .
"' See id., Comment (c):
[T]he justification for . . . strict liability has been said to be that
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any mem-
ber of the consuming public who may be injured by it; . . . that
public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused
by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained . . .
351d.
31 See, e.g., Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109
Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973) (hospital not strictly liable for providing blood infected
with hepatitis); Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390
(1969) (hotel not strictly liable for injuries resulting from fall on defective bath
mat). But see Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969),
in which the court found both a service and a sale where a beauty shop applied
a defective lotion to plaintiff's hair, and refused to distinguish those facts from
a situation where the product was sold for the plaintiff herself to apply. For
arguments in favor of extension of strict liability to consumer services, see Com-
ment, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial State: The
Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
401 (1974); Comment, Products and the Professional: Strict Liability in the
Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HAST. L.J. III (1972); Comment, Strict
Liability-The Medical Service Immunity and Blood Transfusions in California,
7 U.C.D. L. REV. 196 (1974).
"TGagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).
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contracts to "render service" in repairing or installing a non-
defective product (tangible chattel). "
In Reminga v. United States," an unreported opinion, the plain-
tiff sued the United States and a map company for injuries caused
by an aircraft accident, alleging negligence on the part of the
United States and the map company. Although the court decided
only a jurisdictional issue, it considered the character of the de-
fendant map maker's business. In holding that the map maker
engaged in an activity which led to significant contacts with the
forum state, the court noted:
The injuries which gave rise to this action are such which could
reasonably have been foreseen once defendant embarked upon
such a business venture. Defendant knew, or should have known,
that people who used their product would rely upon its accuracy
as a matter of course, and justifiably so. Further, defendant should
have anticipated the magnitude of potential harm which might
result if its aeronautical maps were erroneously or negligently
manufactured and relied on. This is exactly what plaintiffs here
claim. It would be fair to say, then, that defendant's business has
a realistic impact upon this State beyond that merely resulting
from its dollar volume or number of contracts with customers in
this State.40
When the courts have chosen to characterize a transaction as
a "service" rather than a sale of a "product," it has generally been
because the underlying rationale for strict liability did not apply.
Policy considerations upon which the service versus product distinc-
tion is made were discussed in LaRossa v. Scientific Design Co."
Here, the defendant contracted to design, engineer, and supervise
the construction of a new plant for the production of a commercial
chemical. During the final steps in setting up the plant, which con-
sisted of loading a catalyst in the form of pellets into a reactor, one
of the plant owner's employees was subjected to dust generated
by the loading operation. The plaintiff claimed that the loading
process was unsafe, but did not contend that the pellets themselves
were unsafe. The court drew a distinction between professional
"Samuelson v. Chutich, 187 Colo. 155, 529 P.2d 631 (1974).
3 9 Reminga v. United States, No. K-60-71 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 1978).
SId. (emphasis added).
41 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
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engineering, design, and construction services, and injuries suffered
"in the use of a mass-produced article." It recognized that one
of the main policy reasons behind strict liability was the recognition
that a mass producer of a product should, as a matter of public
policy, bear the responsibility as an insurer against a defect in the
product which causes harm to the consumer. The court found that
professional services do not lend themselves to the doctrine of
tort liability without fault because they lack the elements which
give rise to the doctrine. The chief ingredient missing is a mass-
produced good or product.
When a transaction involves both professional or personal serv-
ices, as well as the transfer of title or possession of a product, a
number of courts refer to the "essence of the transaction" in de-
termining whether strict liability will apply.' In this context the
nature of the service involved generally relates to professional
opinions offered by engineers, architects, accountants, physicians,
dentists, and other recognized professional specialists. When the
essence of a transaction is a service, all aspects of the transaction
are considered to be part of that service, even though a product or
tangible physical object is directly related to the service.
A chart publisher who prepares an approach chart by gathering
information already specified by the appropriate authority and who
depicts that information in such a manner as to be more readily
and efficiently used by instrument rated pilots, may fairly be seen
as providing a service rather than a product. If an approach chart
is to be considered a "product," then an engineer's report and an
architect's plan might also be considered "products." The omission
of a supporting member from an architect's plan or an error in
the structural engineer's report may cause damage or injury. Lia-
bility in such cases has traditionally been contingent upon a show-
ing of negligence.'
11 Id. at 940, 942.
,' See, e.g., Williams & Lee Scouting Service, Inc. v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, writ ref'd); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super.
228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967) (essence of transaction where dentist provides both
service and a product is that of a service).
"See, e.g., Swett v. Gribaldo, Jones & Associates, 40 Cal. App. 3d 573, 576,
115 Cal. Rptr. 99, 101 (1974) (soils engineer not strictly liable for damages re-
sulting from cracks in a tract home); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 679, nn.77-83
(4th ed. 1976).
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In Gagne v. Bertran, quoted with approval in Samuelson v.
Chutich, Justice Roger Traynor wrote:
Thus the general rule is applicable that those who sell their services
for the guidance of others in their economic, financial, and per-
sonal affairs are not liable in the absence of negligence or inten-
tional misconduct.
The services of experts are sought because of their special skill.
They have a duty to exercise the ordinary skill and competence
of members of their profession, and a failure to discharge that
duty will subject them to liability for negligence. Those who hire
such persons are not justified in expecting infallability, but can
expect only reasonable care and competence. They purchase
service, not insurance.'
Precedent governing the liability of professional architects or
engineers may also have application to the professional cartog-
raphers who prepare the approach chart. All are experts in their
field; each is sought out because of his special training and skills.
In DeBardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States,' a tugboat
was damaged in a fire and explosion when it struck a natural gas
pipeline that did not appear on the navigational charts issued by
the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey. The ship owner
filed an action against the United States based on the chart's in-
accuracy. The Court held that "the government .. .must bear
the burden of using due care in the preparation and dissemination
of such charts ..."' A strict product liability standard was not
applied. While the court appeared to rely on the standard of due
care rather than a product liability approach, its emphasis may
have been prompted by the unresolved question as to whether
the United States can be considered a product manufacturer.
In Williams and Lee Scouting Service, Inc. v. Calvert,8 the
defendant company employed agents to obtain information on
recent oil exploration developments. This information, along with
the information obtained from public records and from other
periodicals, was distributed to subscribers in the form of periodic
443 Cal.2d at 487-489, 275 P.2d at 20-21.
4451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971).
"' Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
48 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, writ ref'd).
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reports. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals rejected the claim that
this constituted a "sale" of "tangible personal property," holding
that the essence of the transaction was the supplying of the in-
formation.
Chart publishers provide information to thousands, of sub-
scribers on sheets of paper. It has been argued that it is the informa-
tion, not the paper, which is the essence of the transaction; the
paper is merely the method by which the information is made
available. If, instead of furnishing a chart portraying an approach,
the publisher were to provide a pilot to advise the crew of the pro-
cedures to be followed in effecting an approach, the publisher
would surely be furnishing a service. If the pilot were to fail to
notify the crew of information essential for a safe approach, he
and his employer would be held responsible for any resulting
harm. Liability might be based upon a theory that the publisher
was negligent in hiring this particular pilot, or upon the imputed
negligence of the pilot. There would be no product, and hence no
basis for the application of strict liability.
The distinction between the physical properties of printed ma-
terials and the intangible thoughts, ideas, and information con-
veyed by such materials was recognized in Cardoza v. True.9 The
Cardoza case involved the scope of a book dealer's implied war-
ranty regarding a cookbook. The court found it "unthinkable" that
standards imposed on the quality of goods sold by a merchant
would require him to evaluate and be held responsible for the
thought processes of the many authors and publishers with which
he dealt. The court further observed that publishers are not held
liable where injury occurs through the use of products advertised
in (as opposed to endorsed by) their publications, noting that
strict liaiblity has long been deemed inappropriate in such cir-
cumstances. The court stated:
The common theme running through these decisions is that ideas
hold a privileged position in our society. They are not equivalent
to commercial products. Those who are in the business of distribut-
ing the ideas of other people perform a unique and essential func-
tion. To hold those who perform this essential function liable
regardless of their fault when an injury results would severely re-
strict the flow of ideas they distribute. We think that holding the
"' 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1977).
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bookseller liable under the doctrine of implied warranty would
• . . have the effect of imposing liability without fault not intended
by the Uniform Commercial Code."0
Similarly, in MacKown v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co.,5'
the court refused to hold a newspaper liable for injuries allegedly
sustained by one of its readers when the reader used a dandruff
remedy, recommended to the author by a reputable physician.
When one understands the role that the chart publisher plays in
gathering and disseminating information in a graphic format,
one can appreciate the difficulty encountered in attempting to de-
termine whether the essence of the chart publisher's involvement
is one of providing a service or a product.
Misuse of a product is frequently raised as a defense in a strict
liability action, although misuse is also relevant in determining
whether the product was defective. 2 Misuse is also relevant in
determining whether the defect was a proximate cause of the
injury, since the misuse itself may be found a proximate cause.
The requirements for a proximate causal relationship between the
conduct or product being examined and the loss or injury sustained
has been both a professorial dream and a practical dilemma.
Difficult questions of foreseeability further complicate this issue.
The following example may assist in identifying the problem.
Assume that a chart publisher has properly portrayed the mini-
mum altitude specified by the 8260 form for a given approach. As-
sume further that an obstruction located on the approach course is
not identified either on the 8260 or on the approach chart, but that
its vertical pentration is well below the specified minimum. An
inattentive pilot descends below the minimum and collides with
the unidentified obstruction. It is subsequently learned that the
minimum prescribed in the 8260 was not in compliance with the
obstruction clearance criteria as set forth in TERPS and that had
the minimum been in compliance and had the pilot made the same
error (i.e., the same descent below minimums), the aircraft would
have cleared the obstruction.
Among the questions raised by the preceeding hypothetical are
'Old. at 1056-57.
51289 111. App. 59, 6 N.E.2d 526 (1937).
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment (h) (1965).
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the following: Should a chart publisher ever be held responsible
where its publication is entirely consistent with the 8260 and
not subject to misinterpretation? Where a pilot admittedly errs
in an approach, what margin for error must be provided? What
obligation does the publisher have, if any, to independently attempt
to evaluate the adequacy and/or accuracy of the information pro-
vided in the 8260 or in the equivalent AIP?
If the pilot in the above example descends 100 feet below the
specified minimums, is it not speculative to assume that had the
minimums been increased he would not have continued in his
descent to a similar end. In California, the trier of fact would
have to determine whether the pilot's "misuse" of the chart was
foreseeable. 3
Pertinent to this point is the court's holding in Swain v. Boeing
Airplane Co.," in which the personal representatives of American
Airlines employees, killed in a training flight of a Boeing jet,
brought actions for wrongful death alleging that the aircraft was
carelessly and defectively designed. During trial, the defense of
contributory negligence was raised, although it would ordinarily
not be a defense in a strict liability case." The defendant argued
that the plane had been put through violent maneuvers and that
it had been flown unskillfully during the training maneuver. After
having introduced the evidence of misuse, the defendant withdrew
its defense of contributory negligence. Following a verdict for the
defendant the plaintiff appealed, asserting that the trial court erred
in permitting the jury to consider the possible misuse of the aircraft.
The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, Judge Friendly
writing:
However, even under the principle of strict liability, the manu-
facturer is liable only if the plaintiff proves the accident was
caused by delivery of the article in a "defective condition," which
is to say "not safe for normal handling and consumption." [cita-
"In California, a product manufacturer will be held liable despite the misuse
of the product if the misuse is found to have been reasonably foreseeable. Cronin
v. J.B.E. Olson Co., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
"337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964).
"See Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr.
306 (1968) (failure of plaintiff to discover defect in tire held to be no defense);
Sweeny v. Matthews, 94 II1. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968) (failure of plain-
tiff to realize that concrete nail was likely to shatter held to be no defense).
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tion omitted]. The inference of the existence and causality of a
defect would indeed be bolstered if the manufacturer admitted
that improper use played no part in the accident. But Boeing's
withdrawal of the contributory negligence defense for lack of
affirmative proof as to who was misusing the plane in no way
conceded that the plane was not being misused; it remained
.for the jury to decide whether the plaintiffs had sustained their
burden of showing that the crash was due to a defect rather than
to negligent operation or some other cause for which the manu-
facturer would not be responsible."
It would appear from Judge Friendly's opinion that he drew
a distinction between what might be considered a pilot's con-
tributory negligence in the operation of his aircraft and the pilot's
"misuse" of the aircraft. Should it be alleged that a chart pub-
lisher designed a product that led a crew into a misinterpretation
of the procedure, one could readily see how the defense would
raise the pilot's lack of training, inattentiveness, etc. When these
issues are raised in defense of a particular procedure or chart, it
would be necessary for a court to determine whether the pilot's
contribututory error would be better described as negligence or
whether it would rise to the level of product misuse.
There is no single definition of "defect" that applies to all sit-
uations. 7 Some courts have applied the "merchantibility test,"
holding that a defect under strict tort liability principles does not
differ from a breach of the implied warranty of merchantibility. "
According to this definition, a product is not defective when it
is reasonably fit for its intended purpose. The Restatement provides
that the seller may not be held liable when he delivers the pro-
duct in a safe condition, and where subsequent mishandling renders
the product dangerous by the time the accident occurs. 9 This
test focuses on the safety of the product when it is used for its
intended purpose and in a reasonably foreseeable manner. Some
courts apply what may be termed the "reasonable consumer ex-
5 337 F.2d at 942 (emphasis added).
" See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Product and Strict Li-
ability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
" Strict liability has essentially superseded the implied warranty concept in
California. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
"
9See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment (g) (1965).
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pectation test." This test is also described in the Restatement,"
and focuses on the reasonable expectations of the user. To estab-
lish a "defect" it must be found: (1) that the product was in a
condition not contemplated by the consumer; and, (2) that the
condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous."'
In determining whether a defect renders a product unreason-
ably dangerous, recent cases have tended to take a broad view
of the question, requiring the jury to consider virtually all aspects
of the product and the use to which it can foreseeably be put.
Illustrative of this approach is Byrns v. Riddell," where the court
cited Dorsey v. Yoder63 with approval in requiring the following
factors to be considered in determining whether a defect rendered
the product unreasonably dangerous:
1. the usefulness and desirability of the product;
2. the availability of other and safer products to meet the same
need;
3. the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness;
4. the obviousness of the danger;
5. common knowledge and normal public expectation of the dan-
ger (particularly for established products);
6. the avoidability of injury by care in the use of the product
(including the effect of instructions or warnings);
7. the ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing
the usefulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.
While many jurisdictions have struggled with the problem of
providing the trier of fact with guidelines to be used in determining
whether the product can be considered defective in its design,
little progress has been made. Whether it is possible for a lay
jury to judge the design adequacy of an instrument approach
procedure is a question beyond the scope of this article.'
In January 1978, the California Supreme Court added to the
60 d.
61Id.
62 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976).
"331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afl'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
550 P.2d at 1068.
A very real problem is presented when a jury is asked to make a design
selection where the information upon which they are to base their selection is
presented in an adversary environment.
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trial lawyer's confusion with the Barker v. Lulr decision. In Bar-
ker, the court attempts to outline the type of proof that a plaintiff
must present in a product design case. The court had previously
concluded in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Co." that the "unreasonably
dangerous" element of Section 402A should not be incorporated
into the plaintiff's burden of proof in a product liability case. The
court pointed out in Barker that a manufacturing or production
defect is readily identifiable because the defective product is one
that differs from that which the manufacturer intended. This
type of defect was compared with an alleged design defect, which
cannot be identified simply by comparing the injury-producing
product with the manufacturer's plans, since by definition the
plans will reflect the allegedly defective design.
The court recognized that when a product is claimed to be
defective because of an unsafe design, the "contours" of the defect
concept may not be self-evident. Where such is the case the court
acknowledged that the trial judge may find it necessary to explain
more fully the "legal meaning" of defect. Having acknowledged
the problem, the court concluded that a product is defective in
design if the product "has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when [the product is] used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner," or, if the plaintiff proves that
the product proximately caused the injury, if the defendant fails
to prove that "in light of relevant factors . . . the benefits of the
challenged design . . . [outweigh] . . . the risk of danger inherent
in the design.""
In the context of an allegedly defective instrument approach,
who qualifies as the "ordinary consumer"? Would the pilot who
is familiar with instrument procedures be the ordinary consumer,
or would an untrained lay juror who is exposed to a totally arti-
ficial "crash course" on chart design and IFR procedures be con-
sidered the "ordinary consumer?"69 Where the ordinary consumer
has no meaningful pretrial expectations as to how a product should
" Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978).
17 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
0 The "course" would be artificial in the sense that the influence of advocacy
on the presentation of information could not be avoided.
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perform is the first Barker definition to be disregarded, or will it
still be available when the evidence is in and the consultants for
both plaintiff and defendant have presented their contrary views?
The first Barker definition requires that the product has been
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. If it is' al-
leged that an approach chart was misinterpreted by a crew because
of the chart's propensity for misinterpretation, it is reasonable to
conclude that the chart was not being read "as intended." If, in
order to establish that it was used "as intended," the plaintiff need
only show that the chart was being used to effect an instrument
approach, the qualification is essentially meaningless. If this more
general definition is given to the "as intended" requirement it
becomes difficult to articulate a situation where an "unintended"
use of an approach chart could lead to an accident.
Whether the chart was being used as intended is a moot question
in California if the chart is found less safe than expected and if
it is found to have been used in a "reasonably foreseeable manner."
If the plaintiff contends that the chart was subject to misinterpre-
tation, it could be argued that the misinterpretation, though not
intended, was reasonably foreseeable. The determination of fore-
seeability will again be made by the lay trier of fact. In order for
the trier of fact to fairly assess the reasonable foreseeability of
an alleged misinterpretation he or they would presumably have
to understand the proficiency expected of an IFR rated pilot and
his "reasonable" fallability. An error that would be considered
by a Certified Flight Instructor to be indicative of gross incom-
petence might be considered by a jury to be reasonably foreseeable.
Under the second definition in Barker the threshold question
is whether the product design proximately caused the loss. If an
accident occurred because of an erroneous minimum or because
of an unidentified obstruction which penetrated a prescribed mini-
mum, there would be little question of proximate cause. It is also
difficult to imagine what "benefits" there might be to such a design.
If an error could not be specifically identified and if the allegation
is of a propensity for misinterpretation, a determination of proxi-
mate cause becomes difficult if not altogether speculative. 0
70 If the crew survives or if there is an intact cockpit voice recorder there
may be evidence to support a finding that the asserted misinterpretation actually
occurred.
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As a practical matter, it is difficult to hypothesize a chart de-
ficiency which would support a finding of a product defect that
would not also lead the trier of fact to find against the producer
on a negligence theory." The major distinction between the pro-
duct liability cause of action and a cause of action for negligence
in providing this service lies in the available defenses.
A recent Ninth Circuit opinion may be the harbinger of a more
logical approach to the allocation of fault between plaintiffs and
defendants in a case involving an allegedly defective product. In
Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction and Design
Co.,"2 the supplier of a diesel engine was found to be liable on a
theory of negligence for selling an engine with a defective fuel
filter, which ruptured causing the eventual destruction of a fishing
boat. The owner of the boat, Pan-Alaska, obtained judgment
against the supplier, N.C. Marine, but the district court reduced
the award in proportion to the contributory negligence of Pan-
Alaska, which the court found to be two-thirds responsible for
the loss of the ship. Pan-Alaska appealed. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court, holding that strict product liability is
applicable in admiralty. More importantly, the Ninth Circuit held
that, notwithstanding the fact that N.C. Marine's liability to Pan-
Alaska was based on strict product liability, Pan-Alaska's judgment
must be reduced by the relative percentage of its own negligence:
[O]ur inquiry then is whether or not the relative degrees of each
party's fault or responsibility can be compared in order to ap-
portion the relative percentage of the liability to each party.
Or, in other words, does the doctrine of comparative negligence
(comparative fault) apply as a partial defense to a claim based
on the concept of strict product liability? We believe that it can.'
Under the traditional common law, contributory negligence on
the part of a plaintiff was a complete bar to his recovery on a
theory of negligence. When the doctrine of strict product liability
evolved, public policy considerations dictated that contributory
7" A failure on the part of the publisher to include an obstruction that is not
identified in the 8260 form or AlP source material could conceivably support a
strict liability allegation but could not reasonably support a finding of negligence
for which lack of due care must be shown.
72565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
"Id. at 1137.
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negligence, in its strictest sense, should not be a defense to such
a cause of action. Many jurisdictions have abrogated the absolute
defense of contributory negligence in negligence cases in favor
of the system of comparative negligence or comparative fault."
The Pan-Alaska case represents the next logical step in this evo-
lution. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, a finding
of negligence on the part of the plaintiff would not bar his re-
covery but would reduce the full value of his claim by the per-
centage of his fault which contributed to his injuries. In Pan-Alaska,
the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff's comparative fault should
be considered in cases of strict products liability. "[W]e feel that the
public policy reasons for strict products liability do not seem to
be incompatable with comparative negligence. The manufacturer is
still accountable for all the harm from a defective product, except
that part caused by the consumer's own conduct."'5
The court in Pan-Alaska held that all of the plaintiff's conduct
contributing to the cause of his loss or injury can be compared to
the defendant's liability, regardless of the labels attached to that
conduct.'0 Plaintiff's counsel will frequently argue that a crew's
failure to discover or guard against an alleged design defect is
not a defense in a product liability case. The logic of the Pan-
Alaska court in dealing with this argument is inescapable.
If, for example, the user's conduct in failing to discover or guard
against the product's defect is highly irresponsible and the pro-
duct's defect is slight, it offends our sense of justice and fair play
to impose the whole loss on the manufacturer in the name of
imposing the burden of defective products on manufacturers as
one of the costs of doing business. There is no reason why other
consumers and society in general should bear that portion of
the burden attributable to the plaintiff's own blameworthy con-
duct."
' See generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974).
11565 F.2d at 1138, quoting Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods,
Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alas. 1976).
Id. at 1139. California has recently adopted the Pan-Alaska approach in
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 21 Cal. 3d 724, 575 P.2d 1162, - Cal. Rptr. -
(1978). The majority opinion in this four-to-three decision is well reasoned and
warrants a careful reading.
71565 F.2d at 1139-40.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The chart publisher's exposure under a Pan-Alaska approach
is fascinating to consider. Certainly if the publisher should fail
to properly designate the minimums required by the 8260 form,
fault on the part of the publisher could be readily established. If it
were alleged that the chart design was defective in that it was
subject to misinterpretation, the subtlety of the design deficiency
and the expected proficiency of the pilot would be determinative
of the chart publisher's ultimate exposure. Where such a com-
parison of crew and chart publisher's fault is permitted, and where
both the crew and the chart publisher are defendants, other ques-
tions are raised: (1) If the more responsible defendant is unin-
sured or underinsured, must the less responsible defendant bear
the entire loss or a disproportionate share of the loss; and (2) if
one party defendant should settle, should the remaining defendant
retain or lose its right to recover from the settling defendant the
difference between the amount paid in settlement and the amount
the defendant would have been assessed if there had been no
settlement. 8
Many jurisdictions which recognize strict product liability allow
a plaintiff whose contributory fault was a concurring cause of the
injury to recover the full value of his loss if a product defect can
be proven."9 Courts have stated that since comparative negligence
is a concept based on negligence and since a product may be found
defective without negligence, the two tort concepts should not be
compared." Assuming the tort system survives the continuing scru-
tiny of our legislative bodies, it is reasonable to expect that the
courts will begin to focus on the comparative fault of the plaintiff
and defendant without regard to whether the theory pursued is
one in negligence or product liability. The logic of the Pan-Alaska
case is sound, and if it should find broad acceptance, the product
manufacturer may obtain a degree of relief where the fault of
8 These questions are considered in a recent California Supreme Court opin-
ion. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
" See note 53 and accompanying text, supra.
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A, Comment (n) (1965). The
logic of this position has never been demonstrated satisfactorily to the author.
See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 522 (4th ed. 1976).
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others, including the plaintiff, can be proven. The allocation of
fault would not produce the harsh result associated with a contribu-
tory negligence defense, but would promote a more equitable dis-
tribution of the loss.
In analyzing the potential liability of the chart publisher, one
need only refer by analogy to other cases dealing with negligence
and product liability. The problems faced by the chart publisher
are not unique but must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
While a chart publisher's case may be decided by a lay jury which
lacks experience in chart design and instrument approach proce-
dures, they suffer from no greater disability than jurors dealing
with complex accounting questions, anti-trust litigation, automobile
and aircraft design, and literally hundreds of other subjects which
are commonly presented to a jury of our "peers."
The potential exposure of the chart publisher can only be de-
scribed as staggering. The service provided is absolutely essential
to safe air navigation, and all who benefit from the service will
have to bear the cost of insuring the publishers' continuing service.
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